ERD Organization

SUDAN

CIVILIAN IMPACT REPORT

QUARTER 2 - 2026

APRIL 1 – JUNE 2026 · FINAL Q2 EDITION · PUBLISHED AUGUST 5th, 2026

Documenting the slow war on civilian life: power and water collapse, healthcare and economic destruction, forced child recruitment, and an accountability gap a foreign court is filling that Sudan's own institutions have not, across **South Kordofan**, **West Kordofan**, **Central Darfur**, and **North Abyei**.

*Based on field testimony from ERD Organization field teams; reporting and data from the UN (**OCHA, WHO, WFP, FAO, UNICEF, OHCHR**), **Human Rights Watch, Legal Action Worldwide, IOM**, and verified Sudanese and international media.*

"Sudan Jebel Marra Deriba Lakes edited.jpg" by **J Williams (Hammy07)** is licensed under **CC BY-SA 3.0**.

ERD ORGANIZATION

Registered with Sudan's **Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC)** · National NGO · erdorganization.org

CIVILIAN IMPACT REPORT

The Scale of the Crisis

April 1 – June 2026 · South Kordofan, West Kordofan, Central Darfur, North Abyei

"A foreign court is doing what Sudan's own institutions have not: hearing a case for justice."

- On **June 9, 2026**, **Legal Action Worldwide** filed the first universal jurisdiction war crimes complaint in **Kenya**'s history, naming **ten RSF members** for crimes against **twelve survivors**.
- Since **April 2026**, at least two senior RSF commanders implicated in operations across **Darfur** and **Kordofan** have defected to the SAF and been publicly welcomed: reintegrated, not prosecuted.
- **37%** of health facilities nationwide are non-functional; over 70% in active conflict zones. **WHO** has verified **217** attacks on healthcare since 2023.
- **19.5 million** people face crisis-level food insecurity or worse (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, IPC Phase 3+); **IRC** estimates suggest the total reaches nearly **29 million** under broader definitions. **14 areas** across **Darfur** and **South Kordofan** face immediate famine risk during the **June–September** lean season.
- More than 1,000 civilians were killed in drone strikes between January and **May 2026** alone, a sharp escalation the UN says is reshaping the conflict's lethality.
- RSF siege conditions around **El Obeid** intensified dramatically in the final weeks of **Q2**, with at least **35 civilians** killed in drone strikes between **June 26 and 28** alone, targeting a funeral procession, a family home, and the **British Hospital**, and **nearly 2,000** people already displaced toward **White Nile** state. A cholera outbreak in **West Kordofan**, linked to the same infrastructure collapse, reached **700 cases** and **60 deaths** by **June 16**.

"Darfur2.jpg" by **USAID / Public Domain**

***Sources: WHO, OCHA, WFP, FAO, UNICEF, OHCHR. Legal Action Worldwide** (Jun 9); **HRW** (Jun 10); **UN News** (Jun 22). Field data: ERD Organization field teams, South Kordofan*

Contents

*Sudan Civilian Impact Report · **April 1 – June 2026***

I. THE SLOW WAR ON CIVILIAN LIFE

Power, Water, and a Grid That Never Existed

Healthcare Collapse

The Economics of Survival

Children in the War

II. DIRECT VIOLENCE

The Drone War, Escalating

Al-Abbasiya Taqali: A Corridor Under Fire

III. THE WAR BEHIND THE WAR

A Foreign Court Acts: **Kenya** v. RSF

Welcomed Back: SAF and the Defectors

Forced Recruitment, Frontline Villages

CLOSING


ERD Field Presence

What Must Happen Next

Sources

CHAPTER I · THE SLOW WAR ON CIVILIAN LIFE

A Grid That Never Existed



"مدينة الدلنج من اعلى الجبل.jpg" by **Ahmed Babiker** (via **Jeezbabo**) is licensed under **CC BY-SA 4.0**. (cropped)

In rural localities in **Kordofan,** there was no national electricity grid before the war — nor any realistic path to building one — only small diesel generators that stopped running seven years ago. The war has not destroyed infrastructure that worked; it has cut off the fuel that might have kept failing infrastructure limping along. “Our generators broke down mechanically, and there's no fuel,” ERD field teams reported. Water transport by pipe has stopped for the same reason: fuel scarcity, not damaged pipes.

Across Sudan more broadly, the picture is one of active destruction layered on top of scarcity. Drone strikes in **El Obeid** this month forced the closure of several medical facilities including a dialysis centre, and shut down water stations serving the city. A cholera outbreak driven by collapsed water and sanitation access in **West Kordofan** has reached **700 cases** and **60 deaths** as of **June 16**. Nationally, an estimated **17 million** people lack access to safe drinking water and **24 million** lack adequate sanitation, conditions tied directly to the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

> *“I sleep on the street near the hospital. Every morning, I wash my face and go out looking for work. I sell water or take on any job I can find, earning just 10 to 20 cents at a time.”*
> ***– a displaced child in Omdurman, on his daily routine to feed himself and his sister***

This household’s daily routine captures scarcity without infrastructure and without any path toward it — both what the war has done to civilian life, and what it has prevented from ever beginning.

Sources: *ERD Organization field teams,* ***Al-Abbasiya Taqali*** *(Jun 2026); UN News/****OCHA*** *(Jun 22);* ***WFP/FAO/UNICEF*** *joint analysis*

CHAPTER I · THE SLOW WAR ON CIVILIAN LIFE

Healthcare Collapse



"Sudan Envoy - Healthcare" by Sudan Envoy is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

37%
of health facilities non-functional nationwide

70%+
non-functional in active conflict zones specifically

217
verified attacks on healthcare since 2023, per **WHO**

WHO verified **217** attacks on healthcare facilities and personnel since **April 2023,** causing **2,052** deaths and **810** injuries. In **El Fasher** alone, more than **200** health facilities are non-functional. This quarter, drone strikes in **El Obeid** forced the closure of a dialysis centre and shut down water stations the facility depended on: a single strike removing two layers of survival infrastructure at once.

In **Al-Abbasiya Taqali locality**, **South Kordofan**, ERD field teams report that **Kodi Health Center**, south of the town, was operating until it was damaged by the war and has not reopened. For the communities it served, the nearest alternative now requires a journey many cannot make.

Three years of attrition compound. A child missing a vaccination today, a maternity ward without power, a dialysis patient turned away: these are not isolated incidents but a system being worn down faster than it can be rebuilt, even in areas where active fighting has paused.

*Sources: **WHO** (Apr 2026); **UN Security Council** Report; **UN News/OCHA** (Jun 22). Field data: ERD Organization, **Al-Abbasiya Taqali***

CHAPTER I · THE SLOW WAR ON CIVILIAN LIFE

The Economics of Survival



"الراعي الصغير.jpg" by **Nani salah** is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.

Sudan's economic collapse is not incidental to the war: in large part it is a documented tactic. Satellite analysis by **Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab** identified **41** farming communities in **North Darfur** attacked by the **RSF** between **March** and **June 2024**, some more than once, in what legal experts described to the Guardian as evidence consistent with starvation used as a method of warfare. At least **236** separate incidents of food-related violence have impacted markets across Sudan since **2023.**

111.8M

head of livestock nationwide before the war, **90%** of domestic meat supply

236

documented incidents of food-related violence affecting markets, 2023–present

41

farming communities razed by the RSF in **North Darfur**, Mar–Jun 2024

Herders have abandoned traditional grazing routes amid widespread livestock looting and rising mortality from disrupted access to pasture and water. **RSF** leadership has banned agricultural and livestock exports from **Kordofan** and **Darfur** to **SAF**-controlled areas, forcing traders onto longer, costlier routes through areas where water itself is scarce. **UNDP** estimates average household incomes have fallen back to levels last seen in 1992, and roughly **90%** of manufacturing capacity in key economic hubs has been destroyed. In late **June 2026**, the **RSF** burned a truck convoy transporting staple crops near **En Nahud**, **North Kordofan**, as it was en route to **El Obeid**, a documented **Q2** instance of the starvation-as-tactic pattern this report describes.

“Many rural communities that depended on farming for income and food have lost their economic base, weakening a sector that previously sustained millions of families.”

– UNDP / Al Jazeera, April 2026

*Sources: **IPI Global Observatory** (**May 2026**); **Guardian/Yale HRL** (Mar 2026); **FEWS NET** (Jan 2026); **Sudan Media Forum**; **UNDP/Al Jazeera** (Apr 2026)*

CHAPTER I · THE SLOW WAR ON CIVILIAN LIFE

Children in the War



"بالعلم نحيا.jpg" by **Nani salah** is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.

Two distinct but converging tracks are pulling children out of childhood in Sudan: those orphaned outright by the war, and those whose families are intact but can no longer survive without a child's income.

Nine-year-old **Suleiman Ibrahim** spends his days cleaning and mending shoes on the street rather than in a classroom. He was orphaned when artillery fire struck his family's home in western **Omdurman**, killing both parents; with no relatives to turn to once the army regained the area, he began working to feed himself. Another child, identified only as **Sammy**, has lived on the street near a hospital for months with his sister, earning one to two dollars a day from odd jobs and water sales.

Fourteen-year-old **Muayed Musa** works as a bus conductor in **Omdurman**, having dropped out of school after his father fell ill and could no longer support the family from their home village. He earns roughly two dollars a day, carried home for food. “There is no one else to support us,” he said.

30,000+
orphaned children on **Khartoum**'s streets before the war; officials say the number is now higher

18%
of displaced households across **Sudan**, **Chad**, and **South Sudan** forced to send children to work

8M
children out of school nationwide; **4.2M** cases of acute malnutrition projected for 2026

*Aid organizations warn that children working the streets face heightened risk of exploitation, hunger, and food insecurity. **UNICEF** told the UN Security Council this week that nearly **80%** of child casualties recorded in Sudan so far in 2026 are linked to drone strikes.*

*Sources: **Al Jazeera**, **Hiba Morgan**, **Omdurman** (Jun 22, 2026); **NRC** survey via **Al Jazeera** (Apr 2026); **UNICEF** Child Alert (Apr 28, 2026); **UNICEF** briefing to **UN Security Council** (Jun 2026)*

CHAPTER II · DIRECT VIOLENCE

The Drone War, Escalating

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights **Volker Türk** told the **Human Rights Council** on **June 15** that drone warfare has reached a new and deadlier scale in Sudan, with both the **SAF** and **RSF** increasingly relying on explosive-laden drones against civilian infrastructure.

1,000+
civilians killed by drone strikes, January–**May 2026** (**UN OHCHR**)

16
drone strikes that have hit health centers directly this year

EL OBEID: A SIEGE UNFOLDING

El Obeid, the capital of **North Kordofan** and a critical hub linking central Sudan to **Kordofan** and **Darfur**, faced an intensifying siege across the final weeks of **Q2**. Drone strikes on **June 8–9** killed at least **15 civilians**; strikes on **June 22** closed a dialysis centre and water stations. On **June 23**, a fuel tanker was struck near a school district. By **June 26**, drones targeted a funeral procession, a residential neighborhood, and the airport district, killing **22 civilians** and wounding **19 more**. On **June 28**, a strike on a family home killed **13 people** including **8 children**; a separate strike hit the **British Hospital**. As of **June 29**, **IRC** warned that **nearly 2,000** people had already fled toward **White Nile** state, but that roads are under attack, fuel has run out, and many who want to leave cannot.

The threat triggered an unusually coordinated response. **Türk** warned on **June 17** of an "imminent offensive" risking fresh crimes; the Security Council demanded a halt on **June 20**, joined by a **29-nation** HRC statement. The US warned RSF against an assault. On **June 24**, seven European foreign ministers invoked **El Fasher**'s "hallmarks of genocide" in demanding an immediate halt. The EU separately imposed sanctions on **seven individuals** in late June, including **Hemedti**'s brother **Major Algoney Hamdan Dagalo Musa**.

OTHER DOCUMENTED INCIDENTS THIS QUARTER

Jun 16	**West Kordofan**: cholera outbreak tied to collapsed water/sanitation access reaches **700 cases**, **60 deaths**.
Jun 27–28	Jun 27: **RSF** attacks humanitarian convoy near **El Rahad**, kills driver, destroys **50** trucks of flour for **El Obeid**. Jun 28: **RSF** attacks on three villages in **West Bara**, **North Kordofan**, kill at least **58 civilians**.

*Sources: **UN OHCHR** / **Volker Türk** (Jun 15–17); **UN Security Council** (Jun 20); **UN News/OCHA** (Jun 22); **Sudan Tribune** / **Emergency Lawyers** (Jun 23); **France Diplomatie** / 7-nation joint statement (Jun 24); **Sudan Tribune** / **HAC** (Jun 27); **Sudan Doctors Network** (Jun 28); **IRC** press release (Jun 29); **EU**; **ACLED***

CHAPTER II · AL-ABBASIYA TAQALI, SOUTH KORDOFAN

A Corridor Under Fire

The road linking **El Obeid** and **Um Rawaba** to **Al-Abbasiya Taqali** has become one of **South Kordofan**'s most contested corridors: a lifeline for displaced families and aid alike, and a recurring target. Drones struck two bridges on this road on **June 21–22**, though humanitarian movement reportedly remained possible afterward. ERD field teams cite a **Humanitarian Aid Commission** record of a deadly drone strike on this corridor dating to **September 2023**, and describe drone activity along the route as continuing "until now," a pattern consistent with this month's strikes on the same road.

Civilians traveling from **El Obeid** toward **Al-Abbasiya Taqali** via **Um Rawaba** have been detained by RSF forces along this route, according to ERD field testimony, described as unarmed, unaffiliated civilians with no connection to either side of the conflict.

ARBITRARY DETENTION · REPORTED TO ERD FIELD TEAMS, JUN 2026


South of **Al-Abbasiya Taqali**, the **Kodi Health Center**, once a functioning facility for surrounding communities, has been damaged by the war and has not reopened, per ERD field reporting. In the village of **Al-Sanadira**, the family of **Omar Mohamed Ahmed** lost its breadwinner to intercommunal tribal violence; the family has faced food insecurity ever since. ERD documents this as a tribal conflict casualty distinct from direct **SAF** or **RSF** action, a reminder that the war's breakdown of order enables harm beyond the two main parties' direct fighting.

*ERD field teams also report displacement from villages west of **Al-Abbasiya Taqali** into the town itself, describing it as significant in scale. ERD has not been able to identify any independent source corroborating a specific figure, largely due to communication difficulties common across this corridor, and is not publishing a number until one can be verified.*

***Sources:** ERD Organization field teams, **Al-Abbasiya Taqali locality** (Jun 2026); **Humanitarian Aid Commission**, local office (incident dated Sep 2023); **UN News/OCHA** (Jun 22)*

CHAPTER III · THE WAR BEHIND THE WAR

A Foreign Court Acts: Kenya v. RSF



"Minneapolis City Council Chambers gavel close up.jpg" by **Czbik** / CC0 1.0 Universal

On **June 9, 2026**, **Legal Action Worldwide** and the **African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies** filed a criminal complaint with **Kenya**'s Director of Public Prosecutions in **Nairobi**, the first time in **Kenya**'s history that a war crimes and crimes against humanity complaint has been filed under universal jurisdiction, allowing **Kenyan** authorities to prosecute crimes committed in another country. The complaint names **ten RSF members** accused of crimes against **twelve survivors**.

Twelve survivors described being illegally detained, tortured, and subjected to sexual violence at sites including **Soba Prison** and the **Al-Riyadh** complex in **Khartoum**.

*"This case will test both **Kenya**'s legal framework and its political will to enforce international criminal law. It demonstrates that avenues for accountability are not entirely closed, even where domestic and international mechanisms have failed."*

– Dr Owiso Owiso, lawyer representing the survivors

For survivors, the complaint marks the first formal step toward accountability they have seen since the alleged crimes occurred. For Sudan, it underscores an uncomfortable fact this report returns to throughout Chapter III: when justice has moved at all this quarter, it has moved outside Sudan's own institutions, not within them.

*Sources: **Legal Action Worldwide** (Jun 9, 2026); **Associated Press**; **The Standard (Kenya)***

CHAPTER III · THE WAR BEHIND THE WAR

Welcomed Back: SAF and the Defectors



"Emblem of the Rapid Support Forces" via Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain.



"Insignia of the Sudanese Armed Forces via Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain.

Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam, known as "**Al-Qubba**," a senior **RSF** commander who played a central role in operations in **North Darfur** including **El Fasher**, defected to the **SAF** in **April 2026** and was publicly welcomed by **SAF** leader **Abdel Fattah al-Burhan**. **Sudan Tribune** reported that **Al-Qubba** recovered a multi-story property in **Khartoum North (Bahri)** as part of his defection agreement, with his bank accounts unfrozen.

Commander Ali Rizq Allah, known as "**Al-Savannah**," a key **RSF** field commander involved in operations across **Kordofan** and **Darfur**, defected in **May 2026** and held a press conference on **May 17** wearing an **SAF** uniform.

> *"Those responsible for serious international crimes and human rights violations do not get a free pass if they switch sides."*
> ***– Human Rights Watch, June 10, 2026***

The commanders who targeted **Darfur** and **Kordofan's** communities with racial and ethnic slurs have now been welcomed back with property and cleared accounts — exposing what that language masked: ethnic targeting was a tactic in a war of personal interest, not conviction. For those communities, the defections inflict a second injury. The crimes remain documentable and prosecution-worthy regardless of motivation. What the defections reveal is why accountability has not come from within: those with the power to prosecute had more to gain from reintegration.

*Sources: **Human Rights Watch** (Jun 10, 2026); **Sudan Tribune** (Apr–May 2026)*

CHAPTER III · THE WAR BEHIND THE WAR

Forced Recruitment, Frontline Villages



Image source: Sudan Human Rights Hub (2025) (cropped)

ERD field teams report allegations of forced child recruitment attributed to **SPLM-N** in contested areas of **western Al-Abbasiya Taqali** locality, **South Kordofan**, along the frontline between **SPLM-N** and **SAF** positions. Field teams describe the practice as occurring "in all areas, unfortunately," not confined to a single corridor.

Independent reporting corroborates a broader pattern: a former **SPLM-N** source told **Mada Masr** that forced recruitment campaigns are not isolated incidents but part of a wider breakdown in security, with some families compelled to surrender a household member to avoid retaliation. Researchers note that **South Kordofan**'s closed security environment makes independent verification of specific incidents extremely difficult for humanitarian and rights actors alike.

This finding sits beside, not apart from, the rest of Chapter III. The same accountability gap that lets a senior commander walk back into the **SAF** with his property restored is the gap in which a fourteen-year-old can be forced from his family at a frontline checkpoint with no named perpetrator ever facing consequence: until, perhaps, a court six hundred miles away decides otherwise.

A note on this section: village-level locations named by field sources are deliberately omitted from this report to protect the communities and individuals who provided this information.

Sources: *ERD Organization field teams,* ***Al-Abbasiya Taqali locality*** *(Jun 2026);* ***Mada Masr*** *(Dec 2025)*

ERD Field Presence

The **Environment and Rural Women's Development Organization (ERD)** is a young women-led Sudanese national organization operating through field teams in **West Darfur**, **Central Darfur**, **North Darfur**, **West Kordofan**, **South Kordofan**, **Khartoum**, **Al-Jazira**, **White Nile**, **Blue Nile**, **Red Sea**, and **Al-Gadaref**. Where international agencies face access constraints, ERD's Sudanese staff remain present, documenting conditions directly, in the same communities where they work on peacebuilding, health, and clean water programming.

A NOTE ON SOURCING IN THIS REPORT

This report distinguishes three kinds of evidence. Where ERD field teams report a direct observation: a damaged clinic, a family's circumstances, conditions on a specific road, it is attributed plainly as ERD field reporting. Where ERD's reporting is corroborated by a named external source (the **UN, Human Rights Watch**, **Legal Action Worldwide**, named media), both are cited together. Where a figure or incident is reported to ERD but not yet independently confirmed, due to communication difficulties common across this region, it is marked explicitly as pending corroboration rather than presented as settled fact.



ERD does not assert which party bears responsibility for an incident unless a named external source has already done so. Individual stories in this edition are concentrated in **South Kordofan** and **Omdurman,** reflecting the geographic reach of ERD's active field teams during Q2; conditions in **Central Darfur** and **North Abyei** remain under-documented in this report due to access constraints.

PRODUCTION METHODOLOGY

This report covers **April 1** through **June 2026**. During production, verified incidents were added chronologically within each chapter as they occurred, rather than held for a single end-of-quarter compilation, because some of what is documented here could not wait. This edition is now closed; further incidents will appear in ERD's Q3 2026 report.

What Must Happen Next

TO ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

- Cease drone strikes on civilian infrastructure: markets, hospitals, schools, and wells are not military targets.
- End forced recruitment of children by all armed actors, including **SPLM-N.**
- Release all arbitrarily detained civilians.
- Restore fuel access for civilian water and power systems independent of military supply lines.
- Immediately halt siege conditions in **El Obeid**, guarantee civilian evacuation routes, and allow unimpeded humanitarian access.

TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

- Support **Legal Action Worldwide**'s **Kenya** complaint and similar universal jurisdiction efforts.
- Do not treat commander defections as a substitute for prosecution.
- Fund Sudanese national organizations directly: they reach communities international agencies cannot.
- Expand support for healthcare and water infrastructure in active conflict zones, not only recovered areas.
- Follow statements with binding measures: the EU, US, and Security Council have warned and condemned; the **El Fasher** precedent shows what happens when warnings carry no consequence.

ERD'S FIELD RECOMMENDATIONS

- Restore or replace fuel-dependent generators and water pumps in **Al-Abbasiya Taqali locality** independent of the broader fuel supply crisis.
- Establish reporting channels that let field teams flag sensitive findings in real time rather than only in scheduled survey rounds.

To engage with ERD Organization directly: **Rounaq Shimila**, Founder & General Manager | info@erdorganization.org | erdorganization.org

Sources Used in This Report

FIELD RESEARCH

Field data and testimony: ERD Organization field teams, **South Kordofan** (**Apr–Jun 2026**)

LEGAL / ACCOUNTABILITY

Legal Action Worldwide · **African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies** · **Human Rights Watch**

UNITED NATIONS

WHO · **OCHA** · **OHCHR** · **UNICEF** · **WFP** · **FAO** · **IOM** · **UN Human Rights Council**

CONFLICT MONITORING

ACLED · **IPC** (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification)

INTERNATIONAL MEDIA

Al Jazeera · **Associated Press** · **Reuters** · **The Guardian** · **The Standard** (**Kenya**)

SUDANESE & REGIONAL MEDIA

Sudan Tribune · **Mada Masr** · **Sudafax** · **Ultra Sudan**

RESEARCH & ANALYSIS

Yale Humanitarian Research Lab · **IPI Global Observatory** · **FEWS NET** · **UNDP** · **Sudan Media Forum**

GOVERNMENT

Sudan Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), **Al-Abbasiya Taqali locality** office, cited for a Sep 2023 incident record

*This report was produced by ERD Organization staff, Sudanese nationals working inside and alongside the communities documented in these pages. This report covers **Q2 2026**, and is dedicated to every person named here, and to those whose stories communication difficulties and active conflict did not yet allow ERD to record in this edition. Their record continues in ERD's Q3 2026 report.*

ERD Organization · www.erdorganization.org

Registered with **HAC**, Sudan · National NGO